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Bottlenecks to Deployment? 
The Challenges of Deploying Civilian 
Personnel to Peace Operations
Executive Summary 
The present report addresses the role of training programmes with re-
spect to the deployment of personnel in peace operations. How effec-
tive is the deployment of trained personnel, and what are the main ob-
stacles to this deployment? We use the Norwegian-funded Training 
for Peace in Africa (TfP) as a case to explore the bottlenecks that 
hamper the recruitment and deployment of trained personnel, espe-
cially civilians, to peace operations in the African context. The present 
study is exploratory in character and our conclusions are tentative in 
nature, as they are based on limited empirical data.  
 
We differentiate between individual and systemic bottlenecks. On the 
basis of the present study we argue that individual bottlenecks, refer-
ring to the respondent’s unwillingness or inability to apply, make up 
for roughly half of the non-deployments. Systemic bottlenecks are still 
a crucial factor. Here, the informal nature of the UN’s recruitment 
stands out. Several of our respondents complain about the fact that 
without personal contacts to push your case, applicants do not stand a 
fair chance to obtain a position. The underlying issue here is that ap-
plications are ‘lost’ in an overburdened recruitment system. Personal 
contacts help candidates by drawing attention to their applications, 
and this allow these candidates to be picked out from the mass of ap-
plicants and to be placed in a smaller group from which the selection 
is made. Those already in the system are most likely to be connected 
with personal contacts that can have this kind of influence in the sys-
tem, and this explains why it is so hard for those not yet in the system 
to get the attention necessary for their applications to be seriously 
considered.  
 
Addressing the gap between the need for personnel in peace opera-
tions and the lack of personnel deployed is a central issue today, and 
more research needs to look into how training programmes may con-
tribute to bridging this gap. Based on extant literature and the present 
study, we make the case for an improved link between recruitment 
architecture of the UN and training programmes. The case of TfP in-
dicates that training programmes should focus more on post-training 
support mechanisms to facilitate trainees’ recruitment. The usage of 
rosters stands out in this context. In the longer run, however, there is 
only so much training programmes can do unless the UN’s recruit-
ment architecture is the object of a significant overhaul.  
1. Introduction: a Sense of Crisis  
Peacekeeping is changing. Since the end of the Cold War, the empha-
sis of UN peacekeeping operations has shifted from ‘cease-fire mak-
ing’1 to supporting the implementation of comprehensive peace 
agreements. Contemporary UN peacekeeping operations have more in 
common with the concept of peacebuilding than with the Cold War 
conception of peace keeping. In some cases, however, UN peacekeep-
ing operations have also been deployed into situations where there is 
no peace to keep. These changes have resulted in a dramatic increase 
in the scope and scale of peace operations. Current peace operations 
call for nine times as many troops, observers and police, and thirteen 
times as many civilian staff compared to a decade ago. This quantita-
tive increase has come alongside a qualitative change in the scope of 
peace operations: the average number of mandates that missions are 
charged with have increased from three to nine over the same period.2  
 
This development has brought about a sense of crisis. The UN De-
partment of Peacekeeping Operations’ (DPKO) annual review notes 
that ‘during 2008, today’s blue helmets found themselves over-
stretched and confronted with numerous and increasingly complex 
operations all across the globe.’3 One of the main challenges facing 
peace operations is what the Annual Review of Global Peace Opera-
tions calls the ‘agonizingly slow’ deployment rates to missions in Af-
rica.4 The high vacancy rates that plague a number of current missions 
are a symptom of the crisis, which many commentators argue charac-
                                                 
 The present research was made possible through a grant from the Norwegian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs through the Training for Peace in Africa Progrmme (TfP). The authors 
wish to extend our deepest gratitude to Fulvio Castellacci of the Department of Interna-
tional Economics at NUPI for helping out with the statistical analysis. Gratitude also goes 
to the TfP partners ACCORD, KAIPTC and ISS, as well as Yvonne Kasumba for exten-
sive and helpful comments on an earlier draft. 
1  The expression ’cease-fire making’ is taken from Fortna and refers to peacekeeping aim-
ing solely to end war, where war is defined as 1000 annual battle related deaths . Defined 
this way, Fortna maintains, UN peacekeeping has historically been remarkably effective. 
See Virgina Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton 
University Press, 2008), p. 6. 
2  U.S. Government Accountability Office, Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could 
Limit Further Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress, 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2008b). Accessed at 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-09-142 on 09.02.2009. 
3   United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations Peace Opera-
tions: Year in Review 2008 (New York: DPKO, 2009). Accessed at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/pub/yir2008.pdf on 30.03.2009.  
4   Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2007. 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008), p. 2.  
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terize peacekeeping today.5 The irony is that UN peacekeeping was in 
a similar predicament in the early to mid-1990s, and as a result of the 
problems experienced with finding and deploying civilian6 and police 
personnel, countries like Norway and others have invested in pro-
grammes aimed at training civilian and police peacekeepers, and plac-
ing them on standby rosters, so that they can be available at short no-
tice when the UN need them. This study addresses a paradoxical as-
pect of this predicament, namely the fact that the increased number of 
trained personnel produces by these programmes has not translated 
into better staffed peace operations. Instead, we are faced with the 
paradox of having, on the one hand, a pool of trained personnel, and 
on the other hand, a vacancy rate of almost 40% in some UN mis-
sions. This study seeks to answer the question why this much needed 
supply of personnel is not being used by the UN at a time when they 
are obviously in dire need of civilian and police personnel? 
 
With the purpose of increasing the number of qualified personnel 
available for peace operations, a number of international training and 
capacity building programmes were initiated in the 1990s. Ostensibly, 
graduates from training courses constitute a valuable pool of skilled 
personnel that DPKO and the Department of Field Support (DFS), as 
well as others such as the UN Volunteers, can recruit from. What hap-
pens to past trainees, however, appears to be an understudied phe-
nomenon, especially with regards to civilian and police trainees. Fur-
ther, available studies indicate that the many in the peacekeeping 
training community is not able to keep track of how many of the peo-
ple that went through their d training programmes have been deployed 
to peacekeeping operations. Conversely, little is known about what 
hinders the effective recruitment and deployment of past trainees. 
What are the bottlenecks to deployment and how can they be ad-
dressed? This paper addresses these questions. We use the Norwegian-
funded Training for Peace in Africa (TfP) as a case to explore the bot-
tlenecks that hamper the recruitment and deployment of trainees to 
peace operations in an African context. By asking trainees directly 
about their experience and opinions relating to their recruitment proc-
ess (if any), this study appears to break new ground in the research 
and knowledge about the impact of training programs. This knowl-
                                                 
5  Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008. 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2009), p. 2. 
6  Note that whilst the EU Civilian Crisis Management concept includes and regards police 
as civilian, the UN and AU treats the police as a separate entity, and civilian for them re-
fers to all the non-uniformed members of staff. A further distinction in the UN and AU 
contexts is that whilst the military and police personnel are seconded to the missions by 
their Member States, and are thus still in the employment of those States (and they display 
their national flags on their uniforms), civilians in the UN and AU are hired as interna-
tional civil servants. In this study the use of the concept ‘civilians’ thus refer to the non-
uniformed international civil servants hired by the UN or AU. It does not include police 
officers. When the study refers to police officers they are specifically identified as such. 
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edge, we hope, can in turn help increase the effectiveness of the UN 
and African Union (AU) recruitment procedures and systems.7 
 
The study is exploratory and our conclusions are tentative in nature, as 
they are based primarily on the data material underlying the report at 
hand. However, based on the available literature and data of this 
study, we make the case for an improved link between the recruitment 
architecture of the UN and training programmes. The case of TfP in-
dicates that training programmes should focus more on post-training 
support mechanisms to facilitate trainees’ recruitment. The potential 
utility of rosters stands out in this context. In the longer run, however, 
there is only so much training programmes can do without the 
DPKO/Department of Field Support’s (DFS) recruitment architecture 
receiving a significant overhaul. As such, the major bottlenecks to the 
effective deployment of trained personnel seems to reside with 
DPKO/DFS itself.  
 
The report first contextualizes the importance and relevance of train-
ing programmes in the current peacekeeping environment. Before pre-
senting the procedures and the empirical results of this study, we in-
troduce the case of the TfP programme and the research procedure be-
hind this study. We then contrast our findings with other training pro-
grammes and see them in the light of extant literature on the field. Fi-
nally, we address the most salient bottlenecks based on the results of 
the present study and in light of available literature. 
 
 
                                                 
7  While this study focuses on the recruitment architecture of the UN, training programmes 
such as TfP also aim to contribute to AU’s peace operations. Whilst TfP trained military, 
police and civilian personnel have served in the AU missions in Burundi, Darfur and So-
malia, these missions were all stabilization type missions and the overall number of civil-
ians recruited to these AU missions have been to low to take into account in this section 
of the study. The TfP Programme supports the AU Peace Support Operations Division 
(PSOD) with the development of the civilian dimension of the African Standby Force 
(ASF). 
2. Background: the Move  
to Peacebuilding  
In order to understand why high vacancy rates have become one of 
most pressing issues for current peace operations, it is important to 
appreciate the reasons that brought about the change in the nature of 
peace operations briefly sketched out above. The move to peacebuild-
ing originated from a realization that traditional peacekeeping did not 
create peace and a wish to deal with the underlying causes of conflict. 
This development has implied more demanding tasks, increased re-
quirements for the skills peacekeepers need to possess, as well as the 
sheer number of blue helmets required to fulfil mandates. The follow-
ing paragraphs sketch out the background of the move to peacebuild-
ing.  
 
Classical or traditional peacekeeping operations were charged with 
observing ceasefires and monitoring peace agreements. This has not 
been effective as a means to actually maintain peace: as Smith8 notes, 
the historical record shows that about 50 % of negotiated peace 
agreements to end civil wars relapse into conflict within the first five 
years. This realization has led to a wish to go beyond cease-fire moni-
toring and to deal more with the underlying causes of conflict, and 
was reflected in changes in the stated aims of the post-Cold War mis-
sions, and mandates that include a broad range of peacebuilding tasks, 
such as the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-
combatants and the supervision or organization of post-conflict elec-
tions. The Brahimi report (re)defined peacebuilding as operations ‘un-
dertaken on the far side of conflict to reassemble the foundations of 
peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations some-
thing that is more than just the absence of war’9 Such missions require 
different civilian, police and military peacekeepers in larger numbers 
and with a much broader set of specialized skills than those required 
for traditional cease-fire missions.10 
                                                 
8  Dan Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act To-
gether. Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, (Oslo: The Royal 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2004). Accessed at http://www.regjeringen.no/ 
upload/kilde/ud/rap/2000/0265/ddd/pdfv/210673-rapp104.pdf on 09.02.2009. 
9  Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, (New York: United Nations, 
2000) Accessed at http://www.un.org/peace/reports/peace_operations/ on 13.03.2009, p.3. 
10  For a snapshot of a burgeoning literature, see: Lisa Schirch, ‘Strategic Peacebuilding: 
State of the Field.’ Peace Prints: South Asian Journal of Peacebuilding, vol. 1 no. 1, 
spring 2008, pp. 1-17. Richard Gowan, ‘The Strategic Context: Peacekeeping in Crisis, 
2006-08,’ International Peacekeeping, no 15 2008, pp. 453-469. Michael W Doyle, & 
Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace, (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univer-
sity Press, 2006). Cedric de Coning, Civil-Military Coordination in United Nations and 
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Peacebuilding in the post Cold-War geopolitical context has often as-
sumed a deeply political nature, and has been informed by the convic-
tion that liberal democracies with an open market economy are more 
peaceful than other political and economic arrangements.11 The aim 
was not to create just any peace but more precisely a ‘liberal peace.’12 
The interlinkages between peace, security and development connect 
with the political content of peacebuilding. The World Bank has noted 
that civil war is ‘development in reverse.’13 Hence, peacebuilding can 
be defined as development in the context of a (post)conflict environ-
ment.14  
 
Rapid deployment is an important factor for peacebuilding missions to 
fulfil their mandates in the long run. The Brahimi report noted that the 
first 6–12 weeks after a peace accord or ceasefire are critical for estab-
lishing the success of a peace operation. Chances lost in that period 
are later hard to regain. In that context, the report stressed the impor-
tance of rapid deployment and ‘on-call’ expertise mechanisms to en-
sure that the initial build-up period of a peace operation functions as 
smoothly as possible.15 It further warned against the then current prac-
tice of the Security Council to authorize missions before it knew 
whether the required troops and equipment would be available. The 
reasoning behind this warning is clear: with insufficient soldiers, po-
lice and civilian personnel to run the mission, blue helmets may be 
unable to carry out their mandate, and may end-up trapped in a mis-
sion without the resources necessary to extract them from their situa-
tion. In the process not just the mission, but the UN as an institution, 
loose credibility.  
 
The move to peacebuilding was well underway when the Brahimi re-
port was published in 2000. Developments since have led to a pre-
dicament the report warned against: peace operations are authorized 
before sufficient troops and equipment to run the mission are in place. 
The DPKO’s 2008 annual review points out that there has been a 
surge in uniformed UN personnel since 1991.Total numbers have in-
creased from well below 20 000 to more than 90 000 in December 
                                                                                                                   
African Peace Operations (Umhlanga Rocks: African Centre for the Constructive Resolu-
tion of Disputes, 2007).  
11  Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Peace and Democracy’ in Kurtz, Lester R., (ed.) Encyclopaedia of 
Violence, Peace, & Conflict, (San Diego, California: Academic Press, 1999), pp. 643 - 
652.  
12  Gowan, Peacekeeping in Crisis, p. 463. 
13  Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. 
Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding, p. 25.  
14  Smith, Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together. 
Overview report of the Joint Utstein Study of Peacebuilding and de Coning, Civil-Military 
Coordination in United Nations and African Peace Operations. 
15  Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, pp. 18-19.  
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2008. This number has been more than doubled since 2004, a year 
when four new missions were established.16  
 
The high vacancy rates of current operations in Africa have in other 
words been an announced predicament. The move to peacebuilding 
originated from a wish to deal with underlying causes of conflict, but 
has seemingly not been followed up by a systemic effort to institu-
tionalise or create an effective recruitment system to accommodate for 
the surge in the number of peacekeepers. Figure 1 shows aggregate 
global vacancy rates for peace operations. 
 
Figure 1. Global Vacancy Rates 
 
 
  (GAO, 2008b) 
 
The lack of peacekeepers constitutes a significant obstacle for peace 
operations to fulfil their mandates. UN operations globally were as of 
late 2008 short of about 18 000 people, or 20 %, of the authorized 
level of more than 90 000 troops and military observers. The average 
vacancy rate of international civilian staff for UN operations between 
2005 and 2008 has been around 22 %. The same number for police 
forces has been 34 %.17 In 2008, the UN was short of 6000 police and 
8000 civilians for its peacekeeping operations, authorized to a level of 
total of 17 500 and 27 600 respectively.18  
 
Deployment rates have slowed down the last years. The mission to 
Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 2000 deployed almost all of its 12 000 
peacekeepers within the first nine months, which within the time 
frame the UN has given itself to set up a mission. In contrast, five 
                                                 
16  The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations envisioned that the UN 
would start up one new mission a year.  
17  U.S. Government Accountability Office, Thousands Trained but United States is Unlikely 
to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements are Needed, (Washington, 
DC: United States Government Accountability Office, 2008a.) Accessed at: 
http://www.gao.gov/ products/GAO-08-754, on 07.02.2009.  
18  Tet Miyabara, Assistant Director of the U.S. Government Accountability Office, Division 
for International Affairs and Trade. Private e-mail received 04.02.2009, subject heading 
‘RE: deployment of trained personnel to peacekeeping operations.’ 
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years down the road in 2005, the mission to South Sudan (UNMIS) 
had only deployed 40 % of its authorized personnel within the same 
time period, a mere 3600 people.19 DPKO’s 2008 annual review 
points to high vacancy rates for the UNAMID mission in Darfur, with 
a discrepancy between authorized and deployed staff of 7121 (37%) 
military troops, 3665 (57 %) police and 5034 (56 %) civilian person-
nel.20 A recent report of the Center of International Cooperation (CIC) 
identifies similar slow deployment rates for MINURCAT in Chad. 
High vacancy rates are particularly acute for the international civilian 
staff. The CIC notes that ‘it is difficult to find either practitioners or 
policy-makers who do not acknowledge the tremendous problem in 
the pace of deployment.’21 
 
 
                                                 
19  Gowan, Peacekeeping in Crisis, p. 459. 
20  United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008. United Nations Peace 
Operations: Year in Review. The civilian personnel include both international and local 
staff.  
21  Center on International Cooperation, Annual Review of Global Peace Operations 2008, p. 
5.  
3. Research Procedure and the Case 
of Training for Peace 
In order to explore the bottlenecks that hinder the effective recruit-
ment and deployment of graduates from training programmes, we 
have studied the Norwegian-funded TfP programme. While this sin-
gle-case study is exploratory and tentative in nature, it allows for an 
in-depth study of the experiences of a selection of past TfP trainees. 
While these experiences are not immediately generalizable to other 
cases, they can create ‘working hypotheses’ or expectations for other 
training programs.22 As such, our research design is that of a probabil-
ity probe.23 
 
We sent out a questionnaire to 265 TfP graduates trained through 
ACCORD or KAIPTC between 2006 and 2008. The trainees were 
asked open-ended questions about their background, type of training, 
post-training support, involvement with AFDEM and subsequent rele-
vant working experience. Those who had found a relevant job were 
asked to describe the process that had led to deployment. Conversely, 
those who had not been deployed were requested to state the reasons 
why they have been unable to find a job.  
3.1 Limits of Study 
This exploratory study faces a number of limits. First, we faced a lan-
guage constraint in that we could work in English only. We were not 
able to send out the questionnaire in French, which is a considerable 
limit since some of the courses were conducted in French-speaking 
countries. However, the language of instruction was English so course 
participants should have been able to respond to a questionnaire in 
English.24 Two people asked for a French version, and we were not 
able to accommodate their needs. Language problems also seemed to 
be an issue for some of the other respondents, judging from the way 
they answered certain questions. For instance, one 49 year old respon-
dent reported to have 39 years of field experience. Some trainees 
                                                 
22  The relevant question for future studies is thus the transferability of the conclusions pre-
sented in this paper. Cf. Yvonne S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, ‘The only Generalization 
is: there is no Generalization’ in Yvonne S. Lincoln and Egon G. Guba, Case Study 
Method. Key Issues, Key Texts (London: Sage Publications, [1985] 2000), pp. 27 - 44. 
23  See Harry Eckstein, ‘Case Study and Theory in Political Science’ in Fred I. Greenstein 
and Nelson W. Polsby (eds.), Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 7: Strategies of Inquiry 
(Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley, 1975) 
24  30 of 205 of KAIPTC attendees received French translations.  
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thought ‘deployment’ necessarily would have to refer to experience in 
countries other than their own. A Congolese national thus stated that 
he had not been deployed despite his experience working for UN’s 
mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). Fur-
thermore, the questionnaire read ‘have you subsequently worked in a 
peacekeeping or humanitarian related field, or have you been de-
ployed in such a capacity to the field?’ (Emphasis added). However, 
some respondents listed all missions they been deployed to in total 
and hence some that took place before 2006. We took care to filter out 
these responses. 
 
Second, limited resources and internet access on part of the trainees 
make up for possible errors in the data. ACCORD and KAIPTC pro-
vided us with the names of 404 past trainees, of which 344 (85 %) 
were reported to have an e-mail. 64 e-mail addresses turned out to be 
malfunctioning, which means that the questionnaires could only be 
sent to 66 % of the 404 trainees. Actual deployment rates may thus be 
lower than what we report, since we were not able to contact all of the 
trainees. Indeed, people without access to internet or with a working 
e-mail address can hardly be expected to apply for jobs online. Lim-
ited resources constitute a bottleneck in its own way. One respondent 
explicitly pointed out that ‘only my limited resources are the one hin-
dering me from achieving higher levels.’  
 
Third, time turned out to be a more important factor than we had 
thought in two different ways that may affect the reported response 
and deployment rate. Answers were received between mid January 
through March 2009. Some of the latest answers we received were 
from people that were currently deployed on missions and stated that 
they had limited internet access in the field. This could mean that we 
have been unable to reach some deployed trainees. Furthermore, we 
do not differentiate between respondents that received their training in 
2006 from those who did in 2008. Because of the long time it takes to 
deploy – an average 180 days for the DPKO/DFS – those that received 
training in mid- to late 2008 are unlikely to be deployed yet.25 
3.2 Training for Peace in Africa 
A short introduction to TfP is due. The training programme started in 
1995 as a partnership between the African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) and the Institute for Security 
Studies (ISS) in South Africa and the Norwegian Institute of Interna-
                                                 
25  The average reported deployment time was over two years, which suggests that most of 
the deployed respondents had received training relatively early in the 2006-08 period.  
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tional Affairs (NUPI).26 In 2004, the Kofi Annan International Peace-
keeping Training Centre (KAIPTC) joined the programme. The three 
African institutions conduct all the training and much of TfP’s re-
search and NUPI conducts some of the research. TfP further cooper-
ates with the African Civilian Standby Roster for Humanitarian and 
Peace Building Missions (AFDEM) through ACCORD. The Norwe-
gian Police Directorate also assists in TfP civilian and police training 
courses. 
 
The Norwegian government responded to calls made in the early 
1990s to strengthen Africa’s peacekeeping capacity by investing ap-
proximately US $ 22 million in TfP between 1995 and 2010. The 
overall goal of the programme is to promote peace by contributing 
towards a self-sustaining African civilian and police capacity for 
peace operations and peacebuilding missions in Africa. TfP has 
trained more than 8500 civilian, police and military peacekeepers 
since its inception, and have generated deployments to more than 15 
peace operations in Africa and beyond.  
 
TfP conducts pre-deployment and in-mission training, primarily for 
civilian and police peacekeepers, and covers issues ranging from con-
flict resolution and prevention, protection of civilians, human rights, 
gender, refugees and internally displaced people and HIV / AIDS. The 
TfP programme aims to deliver capacity-building training, research 
and policy development support that enhances the efforts of the AU 
and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in building African ca-
pacities for peace missions under UN or AU auspices. In particular, 
TfP wants to build up a stand-by capacity of regional police trainers 
that can respond to the increasing demands for mission specific police 
training. On the civilian side, TfP seeks to contribute to a reliable re-
gional stand-by capacity of civilian experts. 
3.3 Post-Training Support and Training for Peace in Africa 
An evaluation report of the Norwegian Agency of Development Co-
operation (NORAD) notes that the success of TfP hinges on the pro-
gramme’s influence on African peace operations. Given the pro-
gramme’s broader aims, however, deployment is only one way to 
gauge its (or other training programmes’) influence on peacekeep-
ing.27 Strengthening African countries’ capacity to respond to security 
                                                 
26  For a detailed outline of the program, see: Randi Solhjell et al, Training for Peace in Af-
rica. An Overview over the Training for Peace Programme, 1995–2008 (Oslo: Norwegian 
Institute of Foreign Affairs, 2009).  
27  In this context, we want to add that the impact and success of training programmes is not 
limited to the deployment rate of its trainees, as the people trained can take advantage of 
this training in other relevant positions too. For instance, a policewoman trained through 
the TfP programme can make use of those skills in her day-time job as well as in a peace 
operation. 
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challenges and contribute to peace operations requires, inter alia, a 
strong and flexible stand-by capability. It is a debate within the TfP if 
training should focus on in-mission courses to ensure deployment, or 
if current pre-deployment capacity building courses should be re-
tained. In either case, the tracking of past trainees seems indispensable 
for the ability of measuring a training programme’s influence. Evalua-
tion reports of TfP since 1999 has stressed the need to improve the 
database and tracking aspect of TfP. However, no action seems to 
have been taken apart from a memorandum of understanding estab-
lished between ACCORD and AFDEM in 2000. In other words, TfP’s 
only tracking mechanism thus far has been of the civilians trained by 
ACCORD and deployed via AFDEM. AFDEM generated 69 deploy-
ments between 2006 and 2008, of which 19 were TfP graduates.28 Of 
the respondents to this study, however, a vast majority had either not 
joined or been approached by AFDEM, and no successful applications 
had resulted from the 22 (15 %) respondents that had been approached 
by the roster with a question about a position.29 
 
 
                                                 
28  Importantly, AFDEM defines ‘deployment’ not only as work in peacekeeping operations 
but also in relevant NGOs and the UN. Of the deployed respondents to this survey, one 
worked at the UN headquarters in New York and the rest had gone to missions.  
29  It does not follow that the cooperation with AFDEM is inefficient. AFDEM only has a 
memorandum of understanding with ACCORD and not KAIPTC. Since the aggregate 
data does not distinguish between ACCORD and KAIPTC respondents, the numbers indi-
cate a disproportionate disfavour to AFDEM.  
4. What Do We Know about  
Training and Deployment?  
Previous studies have established that the UN and other agencies lack 
the ability to identify and recruit a sufficient number of qualified peo-
ple to meet the needs of peace operations.30 Capacity building and 
training programmes such as TfP play an important role in generating 
qualified personnel, for two main reasons. First, they contribute to in-
creasing the number of people interested in and trained to participate 
in missions. Second, they provide a mechanism for the DPKO/DFS to 
identify qualified applicants. This aspect depends on the training pro-
gramme’s system of tracking past trainees through databases or roster 
systems, the access DPKO/DFS has to this information, and the extent 
to which DPKO/DFS may recognize the training provided by TfP as 
valuable to the extent that it improves the likelihood that a candidate 
may be short listed for a position, among a group of similarly quali-
fied and experienced peers. 
 
To our knowledge, only a select few international training pro-
grammes have conducted studies to track past trainees.31 The German 
based Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) issued in 2006 a 
                                                 
30  See African Standby Roster for Humanitarian & Peace-building Missions, ‘TfP / AFDEM 
Proposal 2009.’ (Harare: Afdem, 2009). 
31  The TfP programme was the first of its kind to focus on civilian peacekeeping training 
through ACCORD in Africa. The civilian training programmes that we are aware of and 
considered for this study include the following: ACCORD trains mainly in Southern, East 
and West African regions. The Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) provides 
training in the Eastern and Central African regions. The Legon Centre for International 
Affairs (LECIA), at the University of Ghana, focuses more broadly on peacebuilding and 
election observers in West Africa. Other African institutes that offer civilian training in-
clude KAIPTC in Ghana, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in 
Zimbabwe, and the IPSTC in KENYA. In Europe, the following institutions offer similar 
training, typically for their own nationals: the German Center for International Peace Op-
erations (ZIF), the Swedish Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA), the Italian Scuola Superi-
ore Sant’Anna, the Austrian Study Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), the 
Finnish Crisis Management Centre (CMC), the British NGO International Alert, and the 
Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT). Most of these European centres 
are also members of an EU project called the European Commission Project on Training 
for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. In North America, the Canadian Pearson 
Peacekeeping Center offers a range of integrated (civilian, police and military together) 
training courses. With regards to police training, ISS in South Africa, the KAIPTC in 
Ghana, the SADC Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) in Zimbabwe, and the 
IPSTC in Kenya offer UN and AU police courses. Both the ISS and the KAIPTC are TfP 
partners, and TfP has a Norwegian police advisor with EASBRIGCOM that cooperates 
with the IPSTC. Both ACCORD and ISS cooperate closely with the SADC-RPTC. The 
joint Kenyan – British Humanitarian Peace Support School (formerly International Mine 
Action Training Centre) also provides training for police going to peace operations. Inter-
nationally, Pearson, SWEDINT, CMC and others also conduct police training. 
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monitoring report of election observers trained at the KAIPTC.32 ZIF 
contacted 112 trainees, and report a 71% response rate and a 38 % de-
ployment rate. The Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) did a study for 
the European Union (EU) of civilian experts trained for peace opera-
tions in and by member states.33 They report a 37% response rate, and 
find that 15 % of trainees have been deployed to EU missions, 
whereas 37 % have participated in other international missions. The 
FBA further notes that while it is difficult to establish the reasons for 
non-deployment, one crucial factor is the lack of coordination and pol-
icy among EU member states. The United States Global Peace Opera-
tions Initiative (GPOI) was established in 2004, and aims to train 
75 000 military peacekeepers worldwide by the end of 2010. They re-
port to be on good track to that goal: thus far, 52 000 have been 
trained mostly on battalion level, of which 42 000 or 82 % have been 
deployed. According to the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs of the 
US State department, this is a ‘pretty darn descent’ deployment rate.34 
Importantly, the State Department does not track individual trainees, 
but rather the units that they have trained.  
 
The most relevant information that we have obtained for this study 
pertains to the police part of the TfP programme. This information 
does not come from a published report, but from an official who 
works as a police training co-ordinator at a Permanent Mission to the 
UN in New York. He provided us with information from a database of 
police pre-deployment training for UNAMID. The database contains 
information on trainees from a variety of countries and the institutions 
that have provided the training, including the Pearson Peacekeeping 
Centre, the KAIPTC, and the Swedish Lifeguards Centre, funded 
through bilateral agreements between Norway and Nigeria, Sweden 
and the Gambia, and the US and Nepal. Through these programmes, 
1400 police officers have been trained since December 2007. Of these, 
413 or 30 % have been deployed, and a further 573 or 41 % are on a 
so-called ‘travel status.’35  
                                                 
32  Nana Odo, Monitoring Project Monitoring Post-Training Activities of ZIF-KAIPTC Elec-
tion Observation Trainees (Berlin: German Center for International Peace Operations, 
2006). A similar study for 2008 is under way, but was not available by the time this study 
was written. 
33  Folke Bernadotte Academy, Recruitment and Deployment of Personnel Trained for Civil-
ian Crisis Management, Results from a survey of participants of EGT courses held 2003-
2005 under the framework of the EC Project FBA 2006, (Unpublished report under the 
European Community Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management., 
2006).  
34  Phone interview, 05.02.2009. Aiyaz Husain and Steve Foster. These figures are however 
contested; the GAO report Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further 
Large Deployments and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress finds a 56 % 
deployment as of mid 2008, and unlike the State Department finds it unlikely that GPOI 
will reach the 75 000 goal by 2010. 
35  That is, they are technically deployed but have not actually travelled to Darfur yet. Data 
updated as of March 2009. Personal e-mail from Chris Sharwood-Smith, the UNAMID 
Police Training Co-ordinator UK Mission to the UN in New York. Received 25.03.2009, 
subject heading ‘RE: UNCL: RE: mission specific training’.  
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We do not have a basis to compare against to say what expected de-
ployment rates for TfP trainees should look like. The above studies 
have limited relevance the training and deployment of civilian person-
nel, inasmuch as they deal with different types of training and / or op-
erate in different geographical contexts. Importantly, many deal with 
personnel that are deployed through secondment, whilst the UN re-
cruits individuals on short-term contracts for its peacekeeping mis-
sions. TfP trains civilians and police personnel, and the typical re-
cruitment process for these two groups differs. Civilian staff applies 
on an individual basis to the DPKO/DFS.36 Police on the other hand 
are offered to the UN as part of national contributions, and second-
ment is thus the standard procedure. The decision whether to deploy a 
police officer trained via TfP is thus a decision of the police contribut-
ing country. A report by the Stimson Center points out that some 
countries regards police officers that have participated in training 
courses as a valuable asset, and are consequently reluctant to second 
them to missions abroad.37 Many of the TfP police related training 
courses are however specific pre-deployment training courses, and in 
these cases the participants have already been selected for deployment 
by their respective establishments. 
 
 
                                                 
36  The UN posts its vacancy on the website UN Human Resources office (http://jobs.un.org.) 
Applicants apply through the e-staffing system Galaxy, and the office of human resources 
has the job of sorting the applications and forwarding them to the relevant department. 
Türk notes that the lack of a pre-screening mechanism means that the system becomes 
clogged and overburdened with too many applications. While he notes that there is a clear 
need for a reform and improvement of this system, more research needs to look into what 
such reform would entail. See: Danilo Türk, ‘United Nations in the Era of Reform: The 
Issues of the UN Secretariat,’ CROSSROADS The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, 
no 01 2006, pp. 85–95. 
37  Daniel H. Levine, African Civilian Police Capacity for International Peacekeeping Op-
erations, (Washington, D.C.: The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2008).  
Accessed at: http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=607 on 29.01.2009.  
5. Results  
The empirical data in this study draws on the experiences of 151 TfP 
graduates trained through either ACCORD or KAIPTC between 2006 
and 2008. We sent out a questionnaire to a total of 344 trainees and 
eventually received 151 responses. Calculated from the number train-
ees with working e-mails, this translates into a response rate of 57 %. 
Although we do not have a basis for comparison, the deployment rate 
of 53 % appears very high; indeed, almost too high. Previous TfP re-
ports and evaluations have not been able to establish an exact deploy-
ment rate, but have estimated an approximately 25 % deployment 
rate.38 However, the AFDEM data also shows significantly higher de-
ployments in the period after 2006, and there could thus be a related 
increase in TfP trainees that have been deployed, linked in both cases 
to the growth in the overall number of peacekeepers deployed by 
DPKO and the African Union over this period.  
5.1 Profile of Respondents 
Diversity is a key characteristic of the respondents to this survey. The 
gender balance was 30 % women and 70 % men. The geographical 
spread is good: the 151 respondents come from 37 countries, with no 
one country making up for more than 10 % of the total. 23 countries 
had three or less respondents. 88 % of the respondents are from Afri-
can countries, 10 % from Europe or North America, and 3 % come 
from four Asian countries. 74 % had received civilian training and 22 
% police training. 3 % had received military training. The most com-
mon profession was police (23 %), who received both civilian and po-
lice training. Other common professions were military (13 %) and 
administrative personnel (13 %).39 The respondent’s background does 
not seem to significantly affect his or her chances of deployment. A 
correlation analysis of the data shows that neither gender nor the type 
of training received had any noteworthy bearing on the chance of get-
ting deployed. 
                                                 
38  Solhjell, Training for Peace in Africa. An Overview over the Training for Peace Pro-
gramme, 1995 – 2008.  
39  Although ACCORD conducts civilian training courses, it usually includes a few military 
and police personnel, to ensure integrated training dynamics. That way, civilians can learn 
about working with the police and military from fellow participants already during the 
course experience. 
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5.2 Deployed Trainees 
80 respondents (53 %) had found subsequent relevant work. Not sur-
prisingly, applications through the UN system40 (36 %) and second-
ment (20 %) are the two most common procedures leading to deploy-
ment. The UN Volunteer Service (UNV) make up the third most im-
portant category (10 %), and appears to be a useful gateway for people 
to find a paid position later.  
 
Table 1. What procedure led to your deployment? How were you re-
cruited? 
Stated procedure Number Percentage 
Application through the UN system 29 36 % 
Secondment 1641 20 % 
UNV (United Nations Volunteer Service) 8 10 % 
Individual application42 5 6 % 
Professional duty 2 3 % 
Recruited as a contractor 1 1 % 
Application through the African Union system 1 1 % 
Not answered 18 23 % 
Total  80 100 % 
 
A vast majority (78 %) of the deployed have gone to one mission only 
and most have worked for a relatively long time: an average of more 
than two years (29 months). Police are typically deployed for 12 
months only, so the civilian deployment time should be proportionally 
higher. The 80 deployed respondents have generated a total of 86 de-
ployments to 13 different missions in Africa and beyond. Importantly, 
close to 70 % of the deployments went to either of the following four 
missions: UNMIS (Sudan), MONUC (DRC), UNMIL (Liberia) or 
UNOCI (Côte d’Ivoire). 
                                                 
40  Respondents included in this category indicated that they in some manner applied to the 
United Nations, but did not always specify through which procedure. An application 
through the DPKO’s Galaxy system would be the common way for civilian applicants. It 
is interesting to note that while this is the most common procedure of deployment, it is 
also the system most of the non-deployed trainees complain about. The Galaxy system 
will change to the so-called ‘Talent Management System’ during 2009, where the aim is 
to pre-screen applicants based on minimum requirements for eligibility. 
41  Of these 16, eight had received police training, four civilian training, three military, and 
one respondent had not specified the type of training he or she received.  
42  It is unclear precisely how these respondents got their jobs. This category thus includes 
people who stated that they applied and were selected but without specifying through 
what procedure.  
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Table 2. Where have you been deployed? 
Mission 
name 
Location Number of 
Deployments 
Percent-
age 
UNMIS Sudan 23 27 % 
MONUC Democratic Republic of Congo 16 19 % 
UNMIL Liberia 12 14 % 
UNOCI Côte d’Ivoire 8 9 % 
UNAMID43 Sudan (Darfur) 6 7 % 
UNMIK Kosovo 5 6 % 
AMISOM Sudan (Darfur)  4 5 % 
MINUSTAH Haiti 3 3 % 
BINUB Burundi 2 2 % 
UNIPSIL Sierra Leone 1 1 % 
MINURSO Western Sahara 1 1 % 
UN Head 
Quarter New York 1 1 % 
UNMEE Eritrea and Ethiopia 1 1 % 
Not an-
swered44  3 3 % 
Total  8645 100% 
5.3 Non-Deployed Trainees 
Two questions allowed respondents to explain why they had not found 
work in a relevant field or had not been deployed to a mission. The 
first one invited respondents to state in their own words why they not 
been deployed, and the second asked respondents to elaborate on the 
reasons for not having applied or why an eventual application had not 
been successful. The answers were subsequently grouped into catego-
ries. 
 
The first question relating to non-deployment indicates that ‘not ap-
plied’ (20 %) is the single most important immediate reason for non-
deployment. However, the categories ‘other professional commit-
                                                 
43  Norway, among other countries, has emphasized training for UNAMID. The low deploy-
ment number reported here could result from one of several factors: deployed personnel 
have no internet access in the field and a relative low number of trainees had e-mail ad-
dresses in the first place. However, a UN official working as a training co-ordinator for 
the UNAMID mission states that UN security restrictions are the most important reason 
for slow deployment.  
44  The overwhelming majority of those who had reported deployment have gone on actual 
peacekeeping missions. Those who had not specified what type of work they had done 
stated that they had worked in a related field, broadly understood.  
45  The total number of deployments is higher than the number of deployed, since some train-
ees have gone to more than one mission.  
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ments’ and ‘national legislation’46 combined make up 24 %. These 
two categories include trainees that may be motivated and willing to 
go on a mission, but find themselves unable to due to external con-
straints. Another 20 % stated that they either did not know why they 
had not found a relevant position, or were still waiting for an answer 
from an application. 
 
Table 3. If you have not been deployed, please briefly state reason  
Stated reason Number Percentage 
Not applied 14 20 % 
Other professional commitments 10 14 % 
No response from application 9 13 % 
Rejected application 7 10 % 
Lack of experience or skills 7 10 % 
National legislation 7 10 % 
Do not know 5 7 % 
Not motivated 3 4 % 
Other 2 3 % 
Not answered 6 9 % 
Total 70 100 % 
 
The second question asked the non-deployed respondents if they had 
applied for a relevant position, and requested them to elaborate on the 
answer. Half of them had not applied for a position either. Again, 
‘other professional commitments’ (37 %) constitute a common answer 
for why these people had not applied. More worryingly, an equal 
number of respondents stated that they did not know where or how to 
apply to a position, or stated that they did not know of any opportuni-
ties. One respondent wrote that she had ‘never been given opportu-
nity’ and another that he had ‘no idea how to make the contact.’ Oth-
ers again complained that ‘no one has approached me on joining’ or 
that there exists ‘no information availably freely regarding opportuni-
ties.’ Two respondents pointed a blaming finger towards AFDEM; one 
maintained that she had not applied because ‘AFDEM is suppose to 
aggressively market our CVs in the job market out there’ and another 
that ‘I’m still expecting AFDEM to send me registration form.’ This 
lack of a proactive approach on part of the trainees is worrying, and 
suggests that some trainees have clear expectations of a recruitment 
system that is supposed to obtain jobs on their behalf. However, it also 
indicates that TfP has a job to do in terms of improving the informa-
tion about how to apply to course participants.47 
                                                 
46  This answer typically refers to police officers that have not made it through their national 
selection systems. One police officer from Zambia states that there is a policy of not let-
ting police officers go on more than one mission.  
47 One respondent suggested that course participants be provided with ‘a list of links where 
they can register for deployment to make their exposure to potential employers more ac-
cessible.’ 
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Table 4. Have you applied for work or deployment in this field of work? 
 Number Percentage 
Yes 30 43 % 
No 35 50 % 
Not answered 5 7 % 
Total  70 100 % 
 
 
Table 5. Please explain why you have not applied 
Stated reason Number Percentage 
Other professional commitments 13 37 % 
Do not know of opportunities, job openings or 
where to apply. 13 37 % 
National legislation  2 6 % 
Other  2 6 % 
Not motivated 1 3 % 
Lack of experience or skills 1 3 % 
Do not know 1 3 % 
Not answered 2 6 % 
Total  35 100 % 
 
42 % of the non-deployed respondents had unsuccessfully applied for 
a position. Of these, 37 % found it hard to assess why this was so, and 
reported they had not received any feedback from their application, 
and another 10 % simply stated that they ‘did not know’. Close to a 
quarter were of the opinion that they had insufficient skills and ex-
perience to obtain a position.  
 
 
Table 6. Please explain why you think your application was not successful 
Stated Reason Number Percentage 
No response from appli-
cation 11 37 % 
Poor recruitment system 
/ informal / nepotistic 
nature of the UN 8 27 % 
Lack of experience / 
skills 7 23 % 
Do not know 3 10 % 
Not answered 1 3 % 
Total 30 100 % 
 
 
6. Bottlenecks to Deployment 
In this study, we distinguish between systemic and individual bottle-
necks. Individual bottlenecks refer to the inability or unwillingness of 
trainees to obtain a position in a peace operation, such as lack of 
skills, motivation to apply, and other professional commitments. 
These are people that would not get deployed regardless of how well 
structured the DPKO/DFS’s recruitment was. Systemic bottlenecks 
pertain to faults in the design of how the DPKO/DFS and other actors 
recruit peacekeepers. Since the empirical material of this study stems 
from trainees’ own perception of the situation, we are able to say 
something about the relative importance of individual versus systemic 
bottlenecks. The above data indicates that individual bottlenecks are 
important: the categories ‘other professional commitments,’ ‘not ap-
plied,’ ‘lack of skills’ and ‘motivation to apply’ explain 49 % of the 
non-deployments. 
 
Structural bottlenecks still play a crucial factor. They are also easier to 
do something about in terms of policy. Here, the nature and structure 
of the DPKO/DFS’s recruitment system is the most crucial factor. 27 
% of those who had unsuccessfully applied for a position blamed the 
informal and patrimonial nature of the UN recruitment. Responses to 
that effect stated that ‘to get deployed takes personal contacts’ or ‘I 
think [that the application was unsuccessful] because I did not know 
someone personally to push my case’ or ‘only if there is somebody to 
back you up, for people like us who follow the right channel of the 
recruitment process, hardly get the job.’ Interestingly, two of the re-
spondents claimed separately that a ‘common saying in the UN’ is that 
‘it is more important who you know than what you know.’ Both de-
ployed and non-deployed respondents stressed the importance of 
knowing someone ‘in the system’ to push a person’s application per-
sonally. Based on their experience with a roster meant to serve the 
needs of the UN and the AU, AFDEM contends that the informal 
channels of the UN recruitment mechanisms constitute an obstacle for 
a merit-based recruitment system.48 
 
Our impression is that the informal recruitment structure – and here 
we do not refer to the formal recruitment process, but the role that per-
sonal contacts play in the process – in the DPKO/DFS is a widely ac-
knowledged problem, but available research has not dealt with this 
question in detail. However, previous studies have noted that the 
                                                 
48  Phone interview with Bongie Ncube, Programme director at AFDEM. 26.01.2009.  
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DPKO is understaffed and overworked.49 Job applications to the UN 
are sent through the so called Galaxy e-staffing system, which re-
ceives more than 150 000 applications per year. This creates an en-
demic problem of filtering out qualified candidates for the relevant 
UN peacekeeping missions.50 According to the GAO, the responsibil-
ity for the recruitment of police for UN peacekeeping operations falls 
on the shoulders of the 34-strong Police Division in the DPKO. An 
interviewed official states that he reviews approximately 700 applica-
tions to find 30 qualified people.51 A report on the UN’s capacity of 
deploying police forces to peacekeeping operations the by the Henry 
L. Stimson Center maintains that the UN does not have the capacity to 
deploy in due time.52 The study relates this to the increase of man-
dated tasks and required increase of personnel associated with chang-
ing nature of peacekeeping described above, and chides the ‘current, 
ad hoc system of piecing together a UN mission’s rule of law compo-
nents over the course of many months’ as ‘poorly suited’ to sustain the 
type of transformations required for a peacebuilding mission.53 
 
Communication with relevant research institutes and practitioners in 
the field as well as the literature visited for this study has revealed 
other systemic bottlenecks that are not reflected by the survey results. 
First, obtaining necessary equipment is a problem. Missions are un-
able to provide required equipment for new arrivals. Difficulties in 
obtaining required equipment and provisions for staff such as suitable 
accommodation slows down deployment of all types of personnel, ac-
cording to a report of the Secretary General to the Security Council.54 
Another report on the mission in the Central African Republic, 
MINURCAT, notes that the UN only offers tented office accommoda-
tions due to acute shortage of construction workers. Such conditions 
make it hard to attract and retain qualified personnel, or to deploy 
them even if they have been recruited. 
 
                                                 
49  Gowan, Peacekeeping in Crisis. 
50  Catriona Gourlay. 2006 Lessons Learned Study: Rosters for the Deployment of Civilian 
Experts in Peace Operations (Washington, DC:United Nations Peacekeeping), Accessed 
at 
http://www.canadem.ca/home/documents/DPKO%20Study%20on%20Rosters%20for%2
0the%20Deployment%20of%20Civilian%20Capabilities.pdf on 09.04.2009. 
51  GAO, Challenges Obtaining Needed Resources Could Limit Further Large Deployments 
and Should Be Addressed in U.S. Reports to Congress. 
52  Joshua G. Smith, Victoria K. Holt and William J. Durch, Enhancing United Nations Ca-
pacity to Support Post-Conflict Policing and Rule of Law (Washington DC.: Stimson 
Center Report no 63.) Accessed at http://www.stimson.org/fopo/ pdf/Stimson_UNPOL_ 
Report_Nov07.pdf on 20.01.2009.  
53  Ibid, p. 51 
54  Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations 
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (United Nations Security Council, 2008). Accessed at 
http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/640/80/PDF/N0864080.pdf?OpenEleme
nt on 10.03.2009.  
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Second, deteriorating security situations slow down deployment. The 
UN’s police training coordinator for UNAMID point out that the chief 
reason for the non-deployment of trained police officers to UNAMID 
is the UN security restriction not to deploy more than 1800 – 1900 
police officers.55 Third, AFDEM’s experience with TfP trainees sug-
gests that there is a mismatch between the type of training offered on 
the one hand, and type of people that are currently needed by mis-
sions. A 2004 evaluation report of the EU project for training civilians 
for crisis management points to the same type of mismatch in course 
curriculum and the needs of end users. The report recommends that 
the ‘“supply”’ provided by the course programme […] to be adjusted 
to the probable future demand for staff.’56 While the needs of peace-
keeping missions are in constant flux, there is at least currently an 
oversupply of people trained in human rights and the rule of law. The 
UN needs more mission support staff such as electricians, telecommu-
nication and IT experts, engineers and construction workers. A person 
trained in the rule of law is thus likely to stay passive on the AFDEM 
roster for quite some time. Furthermore, AFDEM maintains that some 
mission requirements are unrealistically high. Especially with regards 
to substantive positions, such as human rights, political affairs and 
civil affairs, the UN requires fifteen or more years of experience for 
an entry level position. Lastly, other systemic bottlenecks include 
problems of obtaining visas and the ability of small mission admini-
strations to process applications in due time.57  
 
 
                                                 
55  Email confirmations from Chris Sharwood-Smith and Odd Anton Utvær of the Norwe-
gian Police Directorate (subject heading ‘SV: TfP og UNAMID’, received 19.03.2009.) 
and Derek Deighton of KAIPTC (subject ‘RE: clarification on KAITPC trainees’, re-
ceived 20.03.2009).  
56  Annika Hansen, Evaluations of the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis 
Management (Phase III), (Oslo: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2007. Pre-
liminary version.). Page 66.  
57  Personal e-mail from Derek Deighton of the KAIPTC. Received 10.12.2008, subject 
heading ‘RE: TfP bottleneck study’. 
7. Conclusion and Suggestions for 
Improvement: The Missing Link  
Between Recruitment and Training 
The lack of deployment of trained personnel to UN missions is of ut-
most importance, and remains, paradoxically, understudied. Through 
the present study we have sought to address this gap. The current 
situation with high vacancy rates and slow deployment is a direct and 
predictable result of the move to peacebuilding. This move was a 
planned and willed development, and although a number of Member 
States, such as Norway through TfP have responded to calls by the 
UN in the early 1990s to invest in training and rostering, the UN Se-
cretariat has evidently not invested in measures to ensure that the ci-
vilian and police peacekeepers needed to fulfil mission mandates 
would be available. The surge of peacekeepers over the last couple of 
decades means that there is a prima facie need for training pro-
grammes, but training is inefficient if it does not also result in an im-
provement in the ability of the UN to deploy more peacekeepers. This 
raises two questions. On one hand, does DPKO/DFS, and other rele-
vant agencies, such as UN Volunteers, take sufficient advantage of 
training programmes and rosters to broaden their recruitment base? 
On the other hand, do training programmes and rosters do enough to 
encourage and support their alumni in the period between training and 
deployment? 
 
It is beyond the scope of the present study to delve into the first ques-
tion, but as pointed out earlier, the study suggests that the mere fact 
that there is such a large gap between those trained on the one hand, 
and the significant vacancy rates experienced by the UN, especially in 
some missions, suggest that this questions deserves serious attention. 
 
Furthermore, we argue that the survey results indicate a room for im-
proving the link between TfP training and recruitment.58 A deploy-
ment rate over 50 % is probably relatively good, although more re-
search is required to verify how reflective this figure is for TfP in gen-
eral. However, most training programmes in the past, and TfP is no 
exception, worked on the assumption that it is their responsibility to 
train personnel, and the UN’s responsibility to recruit them. This 
                                                 
58  The Hansen report, Evaluations of the EC Project on Training for Civilian Aspects of 
Crisis Management (Phase III) also highlights the important of enhancing the link be-
tween training and recruitment.  
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study’s findings suggest that this assumption has resulted in a large 
body of personnel trained and not utilised on the one hand, whilst the 
UN on the other seem unable to find qualified personnel to deploy. 
This is obviously a serious mismatch, and training programmes, which 
are also increasingly evaluated on the basis of how the people they 
have trained were used, can no longer ignore the recruitment aspect of 
the training to deployment cycle.  
 
The questionnaire did not ask the respondents to suggest improve-
ments, but several people still made it a point to highlight, either in a 
separate e-mail or in the questionnaire itself, that TfP needs to develop 
a closer link between training and recruitment. In the view of one re-
spondent: ‘there’s no link between the recruitment and the training.’ 
Another respondent contended the survey is relevant ‘because of the 
no-following up of the trainings in terms of deployment. I think the 
big problem is in the Organisation’s procedures of recruitment…’ and 
further indicated that TfP and the international bodies in charge of de-
ployment need a chart of common understanding to ensure that train-
ing enhances one’s chances of deployment. This view was echoed by 
a respondent who urged the TfP partners to ‘move beyond their pre-
sent position and be more proactive in recruiting qualified existing UN 
personnel who have been trained by their organizations in order to 
improve their ongoing recruiting process.’ In spite of the limited scope 
of the present study, a few tentative conclusions and policy recom-
mendations are nevertheless in place.  
 
Rosters such as AFDEM are, with regard to UN positions, currently 
limited to identifying UN vacancies and informing qualified personnel 
on the roster of the opportunity to apply, because DPKO/DFS only 
accepts individual applications through the Galaxy system. Rosters 
can therefore improve their service to individual applicants by provid-
ing additional services such as assistance with preparing CVs and 
other applications, coaching persons for interviews, etc. There ought 
to be better coordination between rosters such as AFDEM and the UN 
system. If such coordination proves difficult, the system needs re-
thinking, away from either the assumption that the UN can only work 
on the basis of individual applicants, or away from the thinking that 
investing in rosters will result in an increased capacity that the UN can 
use for recruitment.  
 
Some training programmes such as TfP ACCORD has already 
changed course and is now focussing more on in-mission, induction 
and pre-deployment training of already selected personnel. If generic 
pre-deployment training does not result in increased UN capacity be-
cause the UN system is unable to make use of that capacity in its pre-
sent form, then it would make sense to shift to other training ap-
Bottlenecks to Deployment?  
 
35 
proaches, such as the just-in-time type of model ACCORD has al-
ready moved to, for its UN training portfolio.  
 
Training programmes can also do more to encourage and prepare their 
graduates for applying for positions, by including a training session or 
module aimed at informing course participants on how UN recruit-
ment works and how to apply for positions. Training programs and 
rosters can also offer a post-training service by keeping alumni in-
formed of further training opportunities, informing them of vacancies, 
and by providing them with assistance in preparing applications, and 
where possible, by facilitating their applications through networking 
on their behalf with end users, whether these are individual UN mis-
sions or the UN Secretariat in New York. 
 
Training programmes can also improve the selection of course partici-
pants to match mission requirements, both in terms of the types of po-
sitions needed, and in terms of the entry-level requirements for these 
positions. It would be inefficient to invest in training a candidate that 
does not meet the UN requirements. For instance, if the UN requires a 
minimum of 15 years experience for most entry level positions then 
the trainees should reflect that level of experience. Training pro-
grammes could also adjust their training to better meet UN needs, by 
devoting more training to mission support (engineering, logistics, TC, 
finance, personnel, administration, etc.). Closer contact between the 
UN, training programmes and rosters can allow training programmes 
to adjust their training courses, and the selection of course partici-
pants, to match the UN’s changing needs. Training programmes and 
the UN are already networked through the International Association of 
Peacekeeping Training Centers (IAPTC) and many training pro-
grammes undertake annual visits to New York to consult with the 
DPKO’s training unit, but these networking actions do not appear to 
have had the effect of closing the gaps identified by this study. Per-
haps, the gaps would have been much worse if these kinds of contacts 
have not been established.  
 
There is, however, only so much training programmes can do to in-
crease the deployment rate, inasmuch as some of the systemic bottle-
necks lie beyond their reach. In particular, there appears to be a need 
to engage with DPKO/DFS to improve, or make changes to their re-
cruitment system. This is probably best done through a group of like-
minded UN Member States that share the same interest and frustra-
tions. Other UN Member States that have also invested in civilian and 
police training and in developing rosters over the years, include Swe-
den , Finland, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Canada and Ja-
pan. . Such a grouping may be able to engage with the UN through the 
C-34 and other channels, and encourage the UN and the training pro-
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grammes and rosters that these Member States support, to work closer 
together with the aim of closing the training-recruitment gap. 
 
